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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Workplace surveillance technology is inﬁltrating the employee’s daily envi-
ronment. It has been estimated that in the United States more then twenty
million workers were subject to electronic monitoring in 1993, that compa-
nies spent more than $1 billion on monitoring software in 1996, and that
by now 80 percent of US corporations keep their employees under regular
surveillance.1
Employers use video cameras, telephone tapping devices, and computer
monitoring systems. Today it is possible to archive and search all e-mail
and voice communication in call centers, to count keystrokes, or to track the
amount of time employees spend away from their computers. In hospitals,
nurses have started to wear ID badges that electronically transmit their
location to a computerized map, increasing the pressure to move from bed to
bed. Longhaul trucking ﬁrms use the Global Positioning System to track the
truck driver’s speed, fuel use, and route location. Each UPS driver always
carries a computerized clipboard that automatically transmits the number
and duration of stops, the speed of each task, and the driver’s location to
a database, where the information is archived in one of the world’s largest
computers.2
In the United States, the law provides private sector employees with lit-
tle protection from the assault on workplace privacy. The protection oﬀered
by the Constitution applies only to invasions by the state, not by private
employers.3 While the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
which is an amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, makes it illegal for anyone to intentionally intercept wire, oral,
or electronic communication, it speciﬁcally excludes employer-operated sys-
tems from its coverage. In contrast, there are more extensive regulations
oﬀering workplace privacy protection in the European Union, which include
restrictions on data processing and on the collection of sensitive types of
data. As a result, US-based multinationals will be forced to comply with
1See Alder (1998), Froomkin (2000), and Parenti (2001).
2For more on these and further examples, see e.g. Linowes and Spencer (1996), Mishra
and Crampton (1998), Oz et al. (1999), Parenti (2001), and Townsend and Bennett (2003).
3As a consequence, public sector employees enjoy more workplace privacy protection,
because their employer is the state. See Pincus and Trotter (1995).
2EU regulations if they want to exchan g ee m p l o y e ei n f o r m a t i o nw i t hE U -
based operations.4
The purpose of the present paper is to oﬀer a new principal-agent per-
spective on the economic rationale for privacy protection laws that restrict
workplace surveillance. As has been pointed out by Alder (1998), advo-
cates of electronic monitoring employ teleological arguments. They claim
that productivity is enhanced when raises and promotions can be based on
workplace surveillance, and that such technologies will only be implemented
when this increases the total surplus generated by employer and employee.
Hence, the emphasis is on nonmoral results of electronic monitoring for
the organization as a whole. In contrast, proponents of privacy protection
laws typically use deontological arguments; i.e., they are concerned with
the process that leads to the results. They argue that workplace surveil-
lance is unethical, because humans must be treated as persons worthy of
dignity. Electronic monitoring acts as an electronic whip in a new digital
Taylorism, it violates the employee’s basic right to be treated with respect
and is dehumanizing.5
In the present paper, it will be argued that privacy protection laws can
increase the total surplus of an employer and her employee, even if only
nonmoral, economic values are taken into account. To be sure, many peo-
ple would certainly agree that “informational privacy is a good in itself,
and a value worth protecting” (Froomkin, 2000, p. 1467). However, it is
demonstrated here that laws restricting workplace surveillance can be de-
sirable, even if the mere fact of being monitored did not cause harm to the
employee. In this sense, by deliberately stacking the deck in favor of mon-
itoring, the critics of privacy protection laws can hence be beaten on their
own ground.
In the formal model, a simple principal-agent problem with moral haz-
ard as known from the “eﬃciency wage” literature will be analyzed.6 An
4F o rm o r eo nw o r k p l a c ep r i v a c yp r o t e c t i o ni nd i ﬀerent countries, see Plá Rodríguez
(1995) and Pincus and Johns (1997).
5See also Manning (1997) and Martin and Freeman (2003). The fact that “non-
economic” arguments are invoked by opponents of workplace surveillance might help to
explain why mainstream economics so far has been surprisingly silent on this important
issue.
6The term “eﬃciency wage” is used here in the contract-theoretic sense of Tirole (1999,
3employer wants to induce an employee to exert eﬀo r t . T h ee m p l o y e ei s
wealth-constrained, so that the employer must leave a rent to the employee
if eﬀort is a hidden action. As is well known, the employer will then distort
the induced eﬀort level below the socially optimal ﬁrst-best level, in order
to reduce the rent that she must leave to the employee. Assume now that
eﬀort can be made veriﬁable if the employer installs a costly workplace sur-
veillance technology, so that ﬁrst-best eﬀort can be implemented without
leaving a rent to the employee. Note that the employer is only interested in
maximizing her proﬁt, which equals the total surplus minus the employee’s
rent. Hence, if the reduction of the employee’s rent due to monitoring is
suﬃciently large, the employer will incur monitoring costs even if they are
larger than the additional surplus generated by higher eﬀort. In other words,
the employer wastes resources in order to redistribute wealth, so that a law
forbidding workplace surveillance can indeed increase the two parties’ total
surplus.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
the basic model is introduced.7 In section 3, the employer’s problem is
analyzed under the assumption that workplace surveillance is allowed. In
section 4, the eﬀects of a privacy protection law are studied. In section
5, various extensions and modiﬁcations are brieﬂy discussed. Finally, some
concluding remarks follow in section 6.
2 The basic model
Consider two risk-neutral parties, an employer (principal) and an employee
(agent). At some initial date 0, when the parties are still symmetrically
informed, the employer oﬀers a labor contract to the employee, who has no
resources of his own. The reservation utilities of all parties are given by zero.
p. 745) and Laﬀont and Martimort (2002, p. 174). There is also an older literature on
eﬃciency wages (see Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), which is more problematic from a game-
theoretic point of view (cf. MacLeod and Malcomson, 1988).
7Remarkably, while the simple moral hazard model with risk-neutral parties and wealth
constraints is by now a well established part of the contract-theoretic toolbox (see e.g.
Innes, 1990; Pitchford, 1998; Demougin and Fluet, 1998; Tirole, 2001; Che and Yoo, 2001;
Laﬀont and Martimort, 2002; Kräkel, 2003; Schmitz, 2004a), to my knowledge it has not
yet been applied to explore laws restricting workplace surveillance.
4It should be emphasized that no ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible
contracts will be made (i.e., there is complete contracting in the sense of
Tirole, 1999).
A td a t e1 ,t h ee m p l o y e ec a ne x e r te ﬀort e ∈ [0,1]. If there is no workplace
surveillance, eﬀort is unobservable. The employee’s disutility of eﬀort is
given by c(e), where c(0) = 0,c 0(e) > 0, and c00(e) > 0 for all e>0. In order
to simplify the exposition, as usual it is assumed that there exist interior
solutions.8 The veriﬁable return V of the principal is realized at date 2.
The return is VH with probability e and VL with probability 1 − e, where
VH >V L ≥ 0. The employee can be rewarded for a good performance,
but he cannot be punished for a bad outcome, since he has no wealth.
Formally, the compensation scheme when eﬀort is unobservable is given by
w =( wL,w H) ≥ 0, where the employee earns wi if V = Vi is realized,
i ∈ {L,H}.
At date 0, by incurring costs k>0, the employer can install a workplace
surveillance technology (say, a video camera) which makes the employee’s
eﬀort veriﬁable. Let x ∈ {0,1} denote the veriﬁable decision whether the
technology is installed (x =1 )o rn o t .I fx =1 , the employer can condition
the employee’s wage on the actual eﬀort level. The employer can then im-
plement any eﬀort level ¯ e ∈ [0,1] with a simple forcing contract that pays
the employee c(¯ e) if e =¯ e and 0 otherwise.9
The ﬁrst-best benchmark. In a ﬁrst-best world, the eﬀort decision
e and the surveillance decision x would maximize the two parties’ expected
total surplus eVH +(1−e)VL −c(e)−xk. Hence, the ﬁrst-best decisions are
given by xFB =0and ∆V = c0(eFB), where ∆V = VH − VL.
Note that it has been implicitly assumed that the employee does not
directly suﬀer from the loss of his privacy. If we simply assumed that the
worker would incur a disutility when the surveillance technology is installed,
this could only make surveillance less attractive, as has been discussed in
the introduction.
8It is suﬃcient to assume that c
000(e) > 0 and the Inada conditions c
0(0) = 0 and
lime→1 c
0(e)=∞ are satisﬁed.
9Choosing e =¯ e can be made strictly dominant for the employee by paying him c(¯ e)+ε
if e =¯ e,w h e r eε > 0. As usual, it is for simplicity assumed that when the employee is
indiﬀerent (ε =0 ), he chooses the eﬀort level preferred by the employer.
53 S c e n a r i oI :N op r i v a c yp r o t e c t i o n
In this section it is assumed that the employer is free to install the sur-
veillance technology. In order to derive the decision x that maximizes the
employer’s expected proﬁt, let us ﬁrst analyze what contract the employer
would oﬀer if she chose x =0 . Given the compensation scheme (wL,w H),
the employee chooses the eﬀort level e =ˆ e, such that
ˆ e =a r gm a x
e∈[0,1]
ewH +( 1− e)wL − c(e).
Given wH ≥ wL, the following ﬁrst-order condition uniquely characterizes
the employee’s eﬀort choice:10
wH − wL = c0(ˆ e)
Hence, the employer will propose a compensation scheme in order to maxi-
mize her expected proﬁt
ˆ e[VH − wH]+( 1− ˆ e)[VL − wL]
subject to the employee’s participation constraint
ˆ ewH +( 1− ˆ e)wL − c(ˆ e) ≥ 0
and the wealth constraint w ≥ 0. Note that the participation constraint can
be ignored, since ˆ ewH +( 1− ˆ e)wL − c(ˆ e) ≥ wL due to the deﬁnition of ˆ e.
It is straightforward to see that at the optimum wL =0must hold,11 so
that wH = c0(ˆ e). This means that when the employer induces an eﬀort level
e>0, then the employee will enjoy an expected rent R(e)=ec0(e) − c(e),
which is strictly positive.12
The eﬀort level that the employer will implement in the case x =0can
now be characterized as follows:







10Note that the employer will never set wL >w H, since this would induce zero eﬀort,
which can be implemented by paying nothing.
11If wL > 0,t h e nwL and wH could be reduced by the same amount, so that the
employee would still choose ˆ e.
12In order to see this, observe that R(0) = 0 and R
0(e)=ec
00(e) > 0.
6The ﬁrst-order condition is given by ∆V = c0(e0)+e0c00(e0). Note that
e0 <e FB due to the convexity of c(e). When the employer cannot observe
the employee’s eﬀort, she will induce less than the ﬁrst-best eﬀort level,
because in this way the employer reduces the rent she must leave to the
employee in order to give him eﬀort incentives.
As we have already seen, if the employer chooses x =1 , she can induce
any eﬀort level without leaving a rent to the agent. Since this means that
her proﬁt is equal to the total surplus, she will then implement eFB.W e
can thus state the following result.
Proposition 1 Assume that the employer is free to install a surveillance
technology. Deﬁne a critical cost level ¯ k =( eFB−e0)∆V −c(eFB)+e0c0(e0).
If k<¯ k, the employer will set x =1(surveillance) and implement eﬀort
level eFB. If k ≥ ¯ k, she will set x =0(no surveillance) and implement eﬀort
level e0.
Proof. The employer will install the surveillance technology whenever her
expected proﬁti nt h i sc a s e ,eFBVH +( 1− eFB)VL − c(eFB) − k, is larger
than her expected proﬁt if she does not install the technology, which is given
by e0 [VH − c0(e0)] + (1 − e0)VL. The proposition immediately follows.
Note that the ﬁrst-best solution is not achieved, because either the costly
surveillance technology is installed or the eﬀort level is ineﬃciently low.
4 Scenario II: Privacy protection
Suppose now that there is a law that forbids the employer to install the
surveillance technology. In this case, the employer will always induce eﬀort
level e0. Therefore, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 Deﬁne a critical cost level ˜ k =( eFB − e0)∆V − c(eFB)+
c(e0). A privacy protection law that prevents the employer from installing
the surveillance technology has no inﬂuence on the expected total surplus if
k ≥ ¯ k or if k = ˜ k. The law reduces the total surplus if k<˜ k. However, if
˜ k<k<¯ k, then the law increases the total surplus.
Proof. When there is a law that prevents workplace surveillance, the ex-
pected total surplus is given by e0VH +(1−e0)VL−c(e0). In contrast, if the
7employer is allowed to install the technology, the expected total surplus is
eFBVH +(1−eFB)VL − c(eFB) −k if k<¯ k, and e0VH +( 1− e0)VL − c(e0)
if k ≥ ¯ k. The proposition follows immediately. Note that ˜ k<¯ k must hold
since e0c0(e0) − c(e0)=R(e0) > 0.
Intuitively, if the costs of the surveillance technology are suﬃciently large
(k ≥ ¯ k), then the employer will not monitor the employee anyway, so that
a privacy protection law that forbids workplace surveillance has no impact.
If the monitoring costs are very small (k<˜ k), then the employer will leave
no rent to the employee and induce ﬁrst-best eﬀort in the absence of a
privacy protection law. The law would decrease the total surplus, because
the fact that no monitoring costs are incurred would be overcompensated
by the fact that without surveillance, the employer induces an ineﬃciently
low eﬀort level. However, if the monitoring costs are at an intermediate
level (˜ k<k<¯ k), the employer would install the surveillance technology in
the absence of a privacy protection law, even though the additional surplus
that is generated by the increased eﬀort level is smaller than the monitoring
costs. The reason is that surveillance not only allows the employer to induce
more eﬀort, it also means that she must no longer leave a rent to the agent.
The employer’s rent-seeking motive hence implies that she installs a socially
wasteful technology, so that a privacy protection law can in fact increase the
two parties’ total surplus.
5 Discussion
In this section, the robustness of the model with regard to various modiﬁ-
cations and extensions will be brieﬂy discussed. While the analysis could
be made in a more general setting, for clarity it is useful to focus on a spe-
ciﬁc example. Thus, consider the standard case of quadratic eﬀort costs,
c(e)=e2, and let us simplify the exposition by assuming that VH =1
and VL =0 . In the basic model, the ﬁrst-best eﬀort level is then given by
eFB =1 /2, while e0 =1 /4. A privacy protection law decreases the surplus
if k ≤ ˜ k =1 /16, it has no eﬀect if k ≥ ¯ k =1 /8, and it strictly increases
the surplus otherwise. How robust are these ﬁndings with regard to various
modelling assumptions?
85.1 Bargaining power
Following the standard principal-agent approach, it has been assumed that
the principal can make a take-it-or-leave-it wage oﬀer to the agent. If instead
the agent had all bargaining power, the ﬁrst-best solution would always
be achieved (since the agent would extract and hence maximize the total
surplus); i.e., a privacy protection law had no impact at all. What about
the more realistic intermediate cases where the agent may have some, but
not all bargaining power?
Consider ﬁrst the case without surveillance. Note that we can still set
wL =0 .13 Hence, the agent chooses ˆ e = wH/2. L e tu sm o d e lt h ew a g e
negotiations by the Nash bargaining solution, where α ∈ (0,1) denotes the
principal’s bargaining power.14 The parties thus agree on the wage wH that














Therefore, wH =1− α/2 and the eﬀort level is 1/2 − α/4. Note that the
eﬀort level and hence the total surplus is decreasing in the principal’s bar-
gaining power. If the principal has installed the surveillance technology,
s h ew i l ln o wr e c e i v eaf r a c t i o nα of the ﬁrst-best surplus 1/4. Anticipating
these bargaining outcomes, she will choose surveillance if k<α2/8, which
reduces the total surplus if k>α2/16.15 Not surprisingly, the smaller is the
principal’s bargaining power α, the smaller are the cost intervals where a
privacy protection law matters. Yet, the qualitative insights of the basic
model remain valid as long as α is larger than zero.
The observation that privacy protection is less important when the agen-
t’s bargaining power is increased has notable consequences. Prohibiting
workplace surveillance might be particularly desirable when institutions
13Let a contract wH,w L > 0 be given. Consider a new contract ˜ wH >w H, ˜ wL =0 , such
that the agent’s payoﬀ is unchanged if he chooses the same eﬀort level. The principal’s
payoﬀ would then also be unchanged. Yet, under the new contract, the agent will choose
al a r g e re ﬀort level, which makes the principal and the agent (who could still choose the
old eﬀort level) better oﬀ.
14See Muthoo (1999) for a state-of-the-art exposition of bargaining theory.
15In order to see this, note that the principal installs the surveillance technology if
α/4 − k>(1/2 − α/4)α/2. Moreover, the total surplus now is 1/2 − α/4 − c(1/2 − α/4)
when there is no surveillance, while it is still 1/4 − k otherwise.
9(such as unions) that can increase the bargaining power of employees are
weak. In contrast, when there are strong unions, workplace privacy laws
may be less advantageous.16
In the remainder of the paper, it will again be assumed that the principal
has all bargaining power.
5.2 Imperfect surveillance
In the basic model, the agent’s eﬀort level was perfectly revealed when the
surveillance technology was installed. In practice, surveillance might not
be perfect, and its costs may be increasing in the informativeness of the
signal generated by the technology. Hence, consider the following surveil-
lance technology. If the agent chooses e<e FB,t h e nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yπ
t h e r ew i l lb eav e r i ﬁable signal which indicates that the agent is shirking
(independent of V ). The surveillance costs are now given by k(π),w h e r e
π ∈ (0,1). The principal oﬀers a contract (wL,w H,ws
L,ws
H) to the agent,
where the superscript s refers to the states of the world in which the signal
indicates shirking. It is easy to see that it is optimal for the principal to
set wL = ws
L = ws





ewH − c(e) if e ≥ eFB,
e(1 − π)wH − c(e) if e<e FB.




ˆ e(1 − wH) if ˆ e ≥ eFB,
ˆ e[1 − (1 − π)wH] if ˆ e<e FB.
It is straightforward to show that there is a threshold level ˆ π ≈ 0.057,
such that the principal will implement eFB if π ≥ ˆ π.17 Ex ante, the prin-
cipal chooses π in order to maximize her expected ex post proﬁtm i n u st h e
surveillance costs k(π). Whether or not the expected total surplus can be
16However, note that strong unions (as well as workplace privacy laws) may increase
unemployment (see below).
17In order to see this, note that the principal will never pay more than 1.H e n c e ,
ˆ e =( 1− π)wH/2 if (1 − π)
2w
2
H/4 >w H/2 − 1/4, and ˆ e = e
FB otherwise. Thus, the







2 if π ≥ ˆ π, while she implements e =1 /4
by setting wH =1 /(2 − 2π) otherwise.
10increased by completely prohibiting surveillance depends again on the sur-
veillance costs k(π). Yet, even when prescribing π =0is harmful, it can still
be beneﬁcial to prohibit large values of π. This is illustrated in Figure 1,
which depicts the principal’s ex ante payoﬀ and the total surplus in the case
k(π)=0 .1π. If there is no privacy protection, the principal chooses π ≈ 0.44.
The total surplus could be increased by a law that prohibits π > ˜ π ≈ 0.066.
Hence, this version of the model can support privacy protection laws that
allow moderate surveillance but forbid excessive surveillance.












Figure 1. Imperfect surveillance.
5.3 Unemployment
In the basic model it has been assumed that the principal always hires the
agent. Yet, a privacy protection law that implies a rent for an employed
agent might lead to a higher level of unemployment in a more general setting.
In order to see this within our simple partial equilibrium analysis, assume
now that the principal must invest an amount I in order to start her business.
Let k ∈ (˜ k,¯ k), so that a privacy protection law would strictly increase
the two parties’ total surplus in the basic model. Now in scenario I the
principal’s expected proﬁti s1/4−k −I,i ns c e n a r i oI Ii ti s1/8−I. Hence,
if I ≤ 1/8, the results do not change. Yet, if I ∈ (1/8,1/4 − k),t h e n
the principal-agent relationship would be established in scenario I, but not
in scenario II. Hence, if I is a random variable and the lawmaker’s decision
whether or not to prohibit surveillance cannot depend on the realization of I,
11then a privacy protection law increases the probability that the agent will not
be employed. Therefore, allowing surveillance becomes more attractive.18
5.4 External eﬀects
So far, a principal-agent framework has been considered, where the world
consists of only two parties. It is of course well known that laws which re-
strict the actions on which two parties may agree can be beneﬁcial if there
are externalities on third parties.19 Hence, it is interesting to see that a
privacy protection law can be beneﬁcial, even if there are no externalities.
Although the class of contracts that the two parties could write in scenario
I had not been restricted (i.e., there was no incomplete contracting in the
sense of Tirole, 1999), it turned out that the two parties’ total surplus could
be larger in scenario II. In other words, even though the parties had the pos-
sibility to do so, the surplus generated in the presence of a privacy protection
law was not attained in its absence.20
In reality, third parties may well be aﬀected, which can make privacy
protection more or less attractive. For example, workplace surveillance can
increase workers’ stress and jeopardize their health.21 Hence, when the
principal uses a surveillance technology, this might have a negative eﬀect on
the public health system, which in turn would make a privacy protection
law more attractive from a social welfare perspective. On the other hand,
there may be more unemployment when surveillance is disallowed, as has
18For example, if I is uniformly distributed on [0,1/4] and k<1/8, then the probability
of unemployment rises from 4k to 1/2, so that the interval of cost levels k for which a




19For example, consider a cartel contract between two ﬁrms. If third parties are disre-
garded, a law that restricts the two ﬁrms might only reduce the ﬁrms’ total surplus. But
the law may nevertheless be welfare improving, because it makes the consumers (who are
not contractual parties) better oﬀ.
20R e l a t e da r g u m e n t sc a na l s ob em a d ew i t hr e g a r dt oo t h e rl a b o rm a r k e tr e g u l a t i o n s .
For example, Pissarides (2001) asked why the government is needed to legislate employ-
ment protection, even though private parties might agree on secure jobs themselves. It
is shown in Schmitz (2004b) that agency problems due to adverse selection can be the
reason.
21The fact that surveillance can literally make employees sick (causing e.g. headaches,
eyestrain, musculoskeletal problems, anxiety ,a n dd e p r e s s i o n )h a sb e e ns t r e s s e di ns e v e r a l
studies, see e.g. Aiello (1993), Alder (1998), and Martin and Freeman (2003).
12been pointed out above. Unemployment can be socially costly, which can
make privacy protection laws less beneﬁcial from a social welfare perspective.
Indeed, there is a myriad of welfare implications that the diﬀerent wealth
distributions in the two scenarios may have in reality. While a prediction of
a l ls o c i a le ﬀects is obviously out of reach, an agency model such as the one
presented here is still valuable because it can help to clearly structure the
discussion of direct implications that a privacy protection law has within
the agency relationship.
5.5 Wasteful rent-seeking
Throughout, it has been assumed that the surveillance costs k a r eaw a s t eo f
resources. For example, in our two-parties framework this is clearly justiﬁed
if k is simply the principal’s disutility from her eﬀort to install a surveillance
system. Of course, one could argue that if k were the wage payed to a
third party (a supervisor) who monitors the agent, then it would not be
wasted, because it makes the supervisor better oﬀ. However, this argument
disregards the fact that the supervisor must exert eﬀort to monitor the
agent. If the supervisor’s eﬀort costs were zero, the principal would not
make a positive payment to the supervisor and we would be in the case
k =0 . If the supervisor’s eﬀort costs are k>0 and his eﬀort is veriﬁable,
then the principal will pay him k, so that the supervisor’s net utility is zero.
Hence, the costs k are a waste, even if we measure welfare by the three
parties’ total surplus. What is import a n ti st h ef a c tt h a tu l t i m a t e l ys o m e
resources (such as the supervisor’s eﬀort) are merely used to redistribute
wealth, not to create value.22
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In a simple principal-agent framework, it has been demonstrated that a
privacy protection law that forbids workplace surveillance can increase the
two parties’ total surplus, even if the employee’s direct disutility due to
the loss of his privacy is not taken into account. It should be emphasized
that the model can only justify privacy protection legislation that imposes
22For related discussions in the rent-seeking literature that started with Tullock (1967),
see e.g. Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock (1980).
13restrictions on employers who want to monitor in order to reduce their em-
ployees’ rents. It provides no justiﬁcation for laws that restrict, say, the
police or intelligence agencies in the context of crime prevention.23 Further
research that addresses the pros and cons of informational privacy beyond
the principal-agent framework considered here clearly seems to be desirable.
With regard to workplace privacy laws as well as other labor market regula-
tions, it could be particularly interesting to explore the relative magnitudes
of the gains and losses of insiders (employer and employee) and outsiders
(such as unemployed workers and the taxpayers who ﬁnance them) in future
research.
23In 1993, Senator Paul Simon (Illinois) convincingly argued that “it is indeed a sad
irony that while the Federal Bureau of Investigation is required by law to obtain a court
order to wiretap a conversation, even in cases of national security, employers are permitted
to spy at will on their employees” (see Alder, 1998, p. 733). More workplace privacy
protection may indeed be beneﬁcial, but reducing restrictions on law enforcement (see the
USA Patriot Act of October 2001) may also be desirable.
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